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Abstract:	Referendums	on	 regional	autonomy	are	 rare	events	 in	European	politics	but	are	
likely	 to	produce	 important	political	 and	 institutional	 effects.	 This	 article	 provides	 the	 first	
systematic	 account	 of	 the	 autonomy	 referendums	 held	 in	 October	 2017	 in	 Lombardy	 and	
Veneto	 (Italy),	and	seeks	 to:	 i)	explore	 the	origins	of	autonomy	referendums,	placing	them	
within	 a	 wider	 comparative	 framework	 of	 similar	 exercises	 across	 Western	 European	
countries;	 ii)	 explain	 their	 political,	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 roots;	 iii)	 analyze	 the	
campaigns	and	the	results,	assessing	variations	across	and	within	the	two	regions;	iv)	reflect	
on	the	political	and	institutional	implications	of	the	referendums,	and	evaluate	the	extent	to	
which	 they	 could	 lead	 to	 a	 new	 era	 of	 regionalism	 in	 Italy,	 characterized	 by	 further	
asymmetries	and	 fragmentation	both	at	political	and	 institutional	 level.	Far	 from	being	an	
isolated	 case,	 Italy	 can	 provide	 useful	 insights	 into	 the	 new	 politics	 of	 regionalism	 and	
federalism	in	Western	Europe.	We	also	suggest	that	a	more	nuanced	approach	to	the	study	
of	regionalism	should	not	only	focus	on	regional-central	relations	but	should	also	account	for	
tensions	existing	within	regions	(e.g.	regional	vs.	local	levels	and	cities	vs.	provinces).	
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Introduction	
Over	 the	 last	 decades,	 regions	 have	 become	 increasingly	 important	 political	 entities	 in	
European	 governance	 (Keating,	 2013).	 As	 shown	 by	 Hooghe	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 this	 ‘shift’	 was	
particularly	significant	in	Western	European	countries	such	as	the	UK,	Italy,	Spain	and	even	
France,	 which	were	 previously	 characterized	 by	 a	 long	 tradition	 of	 over-centralization.	 In	
some	 cases,	 citizens	 have	 been	 asked	 to	 express	 their	 support	 for	 processes	 of	 regional	
government	 (re)structuring.	 Thus,	 regional	 autonomy	 (or	 ‘devolution’)	 referendums	 have	
been	crucial	moments	 in	the	construction	of	regions	as	political	and	policy-making	arenas.	
But	 what	 are	 the	 drivers	 of	 this	 type	 of	 referendum	 and	 what	 kind	 of	 political	 and	
institutional	effects	can	they	have?		
This	article	aims	to	address	these	questions,	assessing	the	political	and	institutional	origins,	
dynamics	and	impact	of	regional	autonomy	referendums	–	focusing	on	the	two	votes	held	in	
Veneto	and	Lombardy	in	October	2017.	So	far,	no	academic	study	has	provided	a	systematic	
analysis	 of	 these	 two	 cases,	 and	 compared	 them	 to	 similar	 autonomy	 referendums	 held	
across	Western	European	countries	since	the	1970s.	Our	study	bridges	this	gap,	whilst	also	
providing	 a	 cross-country	 comparative	 framework,	 often	 missing	 in	 studies	 on	 individual	
regions	and	useful	for	future	research.		
The	article	starts	with	an	overview	of	the	process	of	regionalisation	in	Italy,	to	set	the	scene	
for	 the	 two	cases.	We	then	examine	 the	origins	of	autonomy	referendums	by	considering	
different	European	experiences.	We	compare	and	classify	autonomy	referendums	based	on	
their	proponents	 and	 their	 key	goals,	 to	position	 the	 case	of	 Italy	 in	 a	wider	 comparative	
context.	 We	 then	 focus	 on	 Veneto	 and	 Lombardy	 and	 assess	 the	 paths	 leading	 to	 the	
autonomy	referendums	in	the	two	regions,	showing	the	underpinning	differences.	Drawing	
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on	 this,	we	 analyse	 the	 referendum	campaigns	 and	 results,	 paying	particular	 attention	 to	
variation	 in	 turnout	 across	 and	within	 regions	 and	 dualism	 between	 cities	 and	 provinces,	
and	 between	 large	 and	 small	 towns.	 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 political	 and	 institutional	
consequences	of	the	referendums	is	followed	by	a	final	section	with	concluding	remarks.	
Regionalization	in	Italy	
Regionalization	in	Italy	has	developed	incrementally.	The	1948	constitution	set	a	framework	
for	an	asymmetrical	regional	system,	which	provided	for	the	creation	of	both	‘ordinary’	and	
‘special’	statute	regions.	Regional	assemblies	in	15	‘ordinary	statute’	regions	were	officially	
established	only	 in	1970	but,	 in	practice,	 regional	governments	remained	quite	weak	until	
the	1990s.	The	gap	between	them	and	the	five	‘special	statute’	regions	(Sicily,	Sardinia,	Friuli	
Venetia	Giulia,	Trentino-South	Tyrol	and	Aosta	Valley),	which	were	created	much	earlier	and	
enjoyed	 higher	 levels	 of	 decision-making	 and	 fiscal	 autonomy,	 was	 significant.	 Several	
interconnected	 factors	 contributed	 to	 an	 acceleration	 of	 regionalization	 in	 Italy	 from	 the	
early	1990s.	Firstly,	the	collapse	of	‘established’	party	system	called	into	question	the	very	
pillars	 of	 the	 Italian	 state	 and	 its	 organization.	 Secondly,	 this	 crisis	 opened	 new	 political	
spaces	 for	 ‘anti-establishment’	 actors,	 such	 as	 the	 Northern	 League	 (NL).	 This	 regionalist	
populist	 party	 (McDonnell,	 2006)	 denounced	 the	 corruption	 of	 the	 national	 political	 elite	
and	mobilized	against	redistribution	of	resources	from	the	wealthy	North	to	the	poor	South	
(Fargion,	2005).	
In	addition,	whilst	territorial	mobilization	was	mainly	concentrated	in	the	North,	the	whole	
country	was	affected	by	a	series	of	reforms,	aimed	at	strengthening	regional	governments.	
A	key	step	in	this	direction	was	the	Constitutional	reform	approved	via	referendum	in	2001.	
This	resulted	in	a	Constitutional	Law	(18	October	2001,	N.	3),	which	modified	the	Title	V	of	
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the	Constitution,	dedicated	 to	 territorial	autonomies	 	–	 introducing	substantial	 changes	 in	
the	allocation	of	powers	between	state	and	regions	(Vandelli,	2014).	Crucially,	this	involved	
a	 revision	 of	 Article	 116,	 allowing	 ‘the	 attribution	 of	 particular	 forms	 and	 conditions	 of	
autonomy	 to	ordinary	 status	 regions’	 (Clause	3)	 and	 thus	 inscribing	 a	 clause	 for	 potential	
asymmetric	regionalism	in	the	Constitution.	However,	the	implementation	of	these	reforms	
was	 far	 from	unproblematic:	 it	 remained	 incomplete	 (see	Vandelli,	2004)	and,	 in	practice,	
none	of	the	Italian	regions	made	use	of	the	new	Article	116	Clause	3	provisions.	The	2005	
Constitutional	reform	also	aimed,	among	other	things,	to	increase	the	authority	of	regions	–	
but	it	was	rejected	in	a	referendum	in	2006.		
Generally,	some	asymmetries	between	ordinary	and	special	statute	regions	did	remain	and,	
as	we	show	below,	different	composition	of	financing	played	an	important	role	in	the	lead-
up	to	the	referendums.	However,	ordinary	regions	were	granted	the	same	formal	powers.	In	
this	respect,	Italy	is	dissimilar	to	cases	such	as	the	UK,	where	the	rise	of	regionalist	and	sub-
state	 national	 demands	 led	 to	 increasing	 institutional	 differentiation	 and	 the	 creation	 of	
devolved	 administrations	 with	 intrinsically	 asymmetric	 powers	 in	 Scotland,	 Wales	 and	
Northern	Ireland	(Mitchell,	2010)	but	not	in	England.		
The	fact	that	the	regionalization	process	in	Italy	retained	a	degree	of	institutional	uniformity	
and	symmetry	among	the	15	ordinary	statute	regions	does	not	mean	that	it	contributed	to	
reducing	 or	 stabilising	 territorial	 inequalities.	 In	 practice,	 regions	 made	 different	 use	 of	
formally	similar	powers	and	institutional	tools,	and	
de	 iure	 symmetry	 has	 not	…	prevented	de	 facto	 asymmetry	 between	ordinary	
regions	 in	 their	 exercise	 of	 policy	 competences,	 owing	 to	 strong	 variations	 in	
their	 administrative	 and	 financial	 capacity	 as	well	 as	 institutional	 performance	
(Palermo	and	Wilson,	2014,	p.	511).	
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This	 was	 already	 noted	 by	 Putnam	 (1993)	 in	 his	 seminal	 study	 on	 the	 performance	 of	
regional	 institutions	 in	 Italy,	which	despite	having	 similar	 formal	powers,	might	work	very	
differently.	He	observed	that	the	governments	of	central-northern	Italian	regions	with	high	
levels	 of	 ‘social	 capital’	 are	 ‘efficient	 in	 their	 internal	 operation,	 creative	 in	 their	 policy	
initiatives	and	effective	in	implementing	those	initiatives’	(Putnam,	1993,	p.	81).	According	
to	him,	civic	traditions	also	‘turn	out	to	be	a	uniformly	powerful	predictor	of	present	levels	
of	socioeconomic	development’	(Putnam,	1993,	p.	156).	Hence,	in	practice,	more	powerful	
regional	 institutions	 interacting	 with	 significant	 discrepancies	 in	 civic	 culture	 and	 socio-
economic	 development	 have	 contributed	 to	 widening	 the	 gap	 between	 Northern	 and	
Southern	 Italian	 regions.	 Recent	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 differences	 in	 institutional	
performance	 and	 policy	 outcomes	 remain	 significant	 across	 regions	 and	 have	 actually	
increased	(Vassallo,	2013;	Vampa,	2016).	
Thus,	 regionalization	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 reduced	 territorial	 inequality	 in	 Italy	 and	
political	 relations	 among	 regions	 have	 been	 characterized	 by	 increasing	 tensions.	 In	 a	
context	 of	 austerity	 and	 economic	 uncertainty,	 the	 precarious	 institutional	 equilibrium	
reached	 in	 the	early	 2000s	was	 increasingly	 challenged	by	opposing	pressures.	 Successive	
governments	 have	 sought	 to	 re-establish	 the	 coordinating	 role	 of	 the	 state	 and	 tried	 to	
recentralize	 policy	 competencies.	 Indeed,	 the	 constitutional	 reform	 rejected	 in	 the	 2016	
referendum	 (Ceccarini	 &	 Bordignon,	 2017)	 would	 have	 produced	 a	 shift	 towards	 a	more	
cooperative	 and	 centralized	 form	 of	 regionalism.	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 this	 wave	 of	
(re)centralisation	 that	was	 aggravated	 by	 the	 economic	 crisis,	 some	 regions	 in	 the	 North	
have	demanded	formal	recognition	of	cross-regional	differences,	which,	in	the	view	of	their	
leaders,	de	facto	already	exist.	Such	bottom	up	demands	push	the	very	issues	that	the	2001	
Constitutional	 reform	struggled	 to	put	 into	practice	 to	 the	 top	of	 the	agenda.	Veneto	and	
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Lombardy	have	done	so	by	resorting	for	the	first	time	to	regional	autonomy	referendums,	
which	 were	 held	 on	 22	 October	 2017	 (Emilia-Romagna	 too	 moved	 in	 this	 direction,	 but	
without	calling	a	popular	consultation	as	this	is	not	a	statutory	constitutional	requirement).	
Although	 only	 consultative,	 these	 referendums	 represent	 a	 clarion	 call	 to	 introduce	 new	
elements	of	 regional	differentiation	 into	the	territorial	structure	of	 the	 Italian	 institutional	
system.	 Despite	 their	 non-binding	 nature,	 the	 referendums	 have	 a	 strong	 political	 value.	
Their	 proponents	 aimed	 to	 use	 the	 results	 in	 a	 strategic	manner,	 as	 a	means	 to	 exercise	
pressure	on	central	government	and	add	a	popular	mandate	 to	 their	demands	 for	 further	
regional	 autonomy.	 After	 having	 traced	 the	 background	 and	 processes	 that	 led	 to	 the	
autonomy	 referendums	 of	 October	 2017,	 in	 the	 next	 section	 we	 place	 these	 within	 a	
broader	comparative	perspective.			
The	origins	of	autonomy	referendums			
Autonomy	 (or	 ‘devolution’)	 referendums	 are	 a	 particular	 sub-group	 of	 referendums.	 We	
define	 them	 as	 a	 general	 vote	 by	 the	 electorate	 of	 a	 sub-state	 region1	 on	 a	 political	
question,	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	 transfer	 of	 authority	 from	 the	 centre	 to	 new	 or	 already	
existing	 institutions	 operating	 in	 that	 region.	 Therefore	 this	 category	 does	 not	 include	
‘independence’	 referendums,	 which	 go	 beyond	 simple	 transfer	 of	 authority	 and,	 if	
successful,	 would	 lead	 to	 the	 full	 secession	 of	 a	 region	 (Oklpocic,	 2012).	 Autonomy	
referendums	are	also	different	from	‘state-wide’	constitutional	referendums,	which	involve	
the	whole	electorate	of	 a	 country	 (and	not	 just	 a	 specific	 constituency)	 and	are	 aimed	at	
ratifying	or	introduce	changes	in	the	national	constitution	(Chambers,	2001).	
Autonomy	referendums	can	be	called	by	central	governments	or	parliaments,	when	there	
are	no	political	institutions	at	the	regional	level	(in	fact,	these	referendums	might	be	aimed	
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at	introducing	such	architectures),	or	by	existing	regional	governments	(or	legislative	bodies)	
themselves.	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 the	 legislation	needed	 to	hold	a	 referendum	can	either	be	
passed	unilaterally	by	regional	institutions	or	it	might	require	the	approval	of	both	national	
and	regional	political	bodies.	The	19972	devolution	referendum	in	Scotland,	Wales,	as	well	
as	the	2004	one	in	the	North	East	of	England,	were	called	by	central	government	because	no	
representative	institutions	existed	in	these	contexts.	Of	course,	in	the	case	of	Scotland	and,	
to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 Wales,	 demands	 for	 a	 devolution	 referendum	 came	 from	 important	
political	and	civil	society	sectors	and	central	government	addressed	these	calls	by	approving	
new	legislation	(Bogdanor,	2001).	Weaker	demands	for	devolution	had	already	emerged	in	
the	 1970s	 and	 the	 Callaghan	 government	 introduced	 legislation	 for	 two	 devolution	
referendums,	which	were	unsuccessful.	The	North	East	of	England	experienced	a	more	‘top-
down’	process	in	which	central	government	played	a	dominant	role	and	regional	campaigns	
were	limited	in	their	impact	(Willett	&	Giovannini,	2014).		
There	are	also	cases	of	autonomy	referendums	that	emerged	from	the	interaction	between	
regional	and	central	political	 institutions.	The	2006	Catalan	referendum	(Colino,	2009)	and	
the	 2011	Welsh	 referendum	 (Wyn	 Jones	&	 Scully,	 2012)	 are	 clear	 examples	 of	 processes	
involving	different	levels	of	government.	In	Spain	other	autonomy	referendums	had	already	
been	 held	 in	 the	 Basque	 Country,	 Catalonia,	 Galicia	 and	 Andalusia	 to	 ratify	 the	 new	
autonomy	statutes	approved	between	1979	and	1981	(Andalusia	was	the	only	one	in	which	
the	referendum	was	mandatory	according	to	art.	151	of	the	Constitution	and	held	another	
referendum	 to	 approve	 a	 new	 autonomy	 statute	 in	 2007).	Unlike	 the	 Scottish	 and	Welsh	
referendums	of	1979,	these	referendums	were	the	outcome	of	a	more	interactive	process	
between	national	and	regional	actors.		
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The	 Veneto	 and	 Lombardy	 referendums	 are	 quite	 peculiar	 in	 the	 European	 context,	 as	
shown	in	Figure	1,	which	helps	us	locate	different	autonomy	referendums	on	a	continuum	
ranging	from	full	central	control	of	the	process	to	full	regional	initiative.	Indeed,	they	were	
fully	 promoted	 by	 the	 two	 regional	 governments	 without	 any	 involvement	 of	 central	
authorities.	 The	 Italian	 Constitution	 (Art.	 116,	 Title	 V	 –	 modified	 through	 constitutional	
referendum	 in	 2001)	 allows	 any	 region	 to	 request	 wider	 autonomy	 from	 the	 centre	 –	
although,	 to	 date,	 its	 implementation	 has	 remained	 dormant	 and	 no	 other	 Italian	 region	
ever	 made	 use	 of	 this	 provision3.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Veneto	 and	 Lombardy	 referendums,	 no	
official	discussions	with	central	state	institutions	were	held	before	the	vote.	Only	the	2013	
referendum	 in	 Alsace	 had	 a	 similar	 ‘unilateral’	 nature.	 Yet	 this	 is	 a	 borderline	 case	 of	 an	
‘autonomy’	 referendum	 since	 it	 was	 aimed	 at	 strengthening	 the	 region	 vis-à-vis	
departments	 (which	 are	 a	 legacy	 of	 revolutionary	 and	 Napoleonic	 centralism).	 The	 result	
would	 have	 led	 to	 ‘special’	 territorial	 arrangements	 in	 the	 French	 region	 but	 not	 to	
substantial	 further	autonomy,	although	opponents	of	 the	reform	highlighted	the	potential	
threat	posed	by	a	more	powerful	Alsatian	region	to	French	unity	(Kleinschmager,	2013).		
	[Figure	1	here]	
Autonomy	 referendums	may	 also	 have	 different	 content.	 They	may	 be	 linked	 to	 reforms	
that	have	already	been	approved	and	need	to	be	ratified	or	they	may	ask	voters	whether	a	
new	reform	process	should	be	started	(the	 former	are	usually	 legally	binding	whereas	the	
latter	are	consultative).	Additionally	they	may	be	aimed	at	introducing	new	institutions	(e.g.	
regional	parliaments)	and/or	transferring	policy-making	or	fiscal	powers	to	regions.	Table	1	
provides	an	overview	of	the	referendums	discussed	above.		
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The	Venetian	 and	 Lombard	 referendums	aimed	at	 starting	 a	process	 rather	 than	 ratifying	
specific	 legislation	 approved	 by	 regional	 or	 national	 authorities.	 They	 mainly	 focused	 on	
transferring	policy-making	and	fiscal	powers	to	existing	institutions.	The	1997	referendums	
in	Wales	and	Scotland	also	aimed	at	starting	a	process	but,	unlike	the	Italian	referendums,	
they	 focused	 on	 the	 creation	 of	 completely	 new	 institutions	 receiving	 new	 powers	 from	
Westminster.	In	Spain,	referendums	held	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	aimed	at	establishing	new	
institutions	and	devolving	powers	by	implementing	reforms	that	had	already	been	approved	
by	 regional	and/or	national	parliaments.	Additional	 reform	processes	 that	occurred	 in	 the	
2000s	were	ratified	by	regional	referendums.		
[Table	1	here]	
The	 issue	of	fiscal	autonomy	was	particularly	relevant	 in	the	Lombard	and	Venetian	cases.	
For	 instance,	 during	 the	 referendum	 campaign,	 the	 regional	 government	 of	 Lombardy	
published	an	official	document	presenting	key	facts	and	figures	(Regione	Lombardia,	2017).	
Much	 emphasis	was	 placed	 on	 Lombardy’s	 negative	 net	 fiscal	 balance.	 The	 gap	 between	
total	 spending	 and	 revenue	 raised	 in	 Lombardy	 is	 in	 fact	 substantial.	 Lombardy	 has	 a	
revenue	surplus	of	54	billion	euros	that	is	spent	by	the	central	government	in	other	regions.	
The	 document	 compares	 the	 Lombard	 figure	 to	 those	 of	 Catalonia	 (8	 billion	 euros),	 and	
Bavaria		(1.5	billion	euros).		
	Asymmetrical	 arrangements	 which	 grant	 more	 fiscal	 autonomy	 to	 neighbouring	 special	
statute	 regions	 such	 as	 Trentino-South	 Tyrol	 and	 Friuli	 Venetia	 Giulia,	 have	 further	
exacerbated	 the	 political	 debate	 around	 regional	 financing	 systems	 in	 Veneto	 and	
Lombardy.	 A	 parallel	 can	 be	 drawn	 between	 Italy	 and	 Spain.	 In	 the	 latter,	 Catalonia	 has	
expressed	 increasing	 dissatisfaction	 with	 arrangements	 that	 exclude	 this	 region	 from	 the	
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special	 fiscal	 regime,	which	applies	 to	 the	Basque	Country	and	Navarra.	The	 link	between	
regional	fiscal	autonomy	and	territorial	politics	has	become	particularly	important	in	Spain.	
As	 shown	by	Gray	 (2016,	 p.	 19),	 different	 regional	 financing	models	 have	 ‘contributed	 to	
contemporary	 shifts	 in	 the	 Basque	 and	 Catalan	 nationalist	 parties’	 territorial	 agendas,	
understood	 as	 their	 goals	 regarding	 the	 relationship	 of	 their	 respective	 regions	 to	 the	
Spanish	state’.	Similarly,	the	issue	of	‘fiscal	federalism’	was	highly	politicized	by	the	NL	and	
its	 representatives	 in	 Lombardy	 and	 Veneto,	 particularly	 after	 the	 party’s	 attempt	 to	
introduce	 ‘fiscal	 federalism’	 (Law	 N.	 42/2009)	 during	 its	 governmental	 experience	 at	 the	
national	 level.	 This	 partly	 failed	 due	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 context,	
namely	the	euro-crisis	and	formation	of	a	new	technocratic	government.			
This	 suggests	 that,	 in	 Italy,	 the	 existence	 of	 institutional	 asymmetries	 –	 de	 iure	 between	
ordinary	 and	 special	 statute	 regions,	 de	 facto	 between	 rich	 and	 poor	 ordinary	 statute	
regions	–	has	 interacted	with	political	 factors.	 It	 is	not	a	coincidence	 that	 the	 two	regions	
holding	 autonomy	 referendums	 have	 traditionally	 been	 the	 core	 constituencies	 of	 the	
strongest	regionalist	party	in	the	country,	the	Northern	League	(Diamanti,	1996).	Crucially,	
Veneto	and	Lombardy	are	also	among	the	richest	Italian	regions.	Indeed,	since	its	creation	in	
1991,	the	NL’s	agenda	was	predominantly	defined	by	socio-economic	issues	–	stressing	how	
wealthier	regions	in	the	North	such	as	Lombardy	and	Veneto,	and	their	dynamic	economies,	
were	being	 ‘exploited’	by	 the	 central	 government.	 In	 time,	 the	NL	also	 started	promoting	
the	 idea	 of	 an	 ‘imagined	 community’	 (Anderson,	 1991)	 of	 the	 northern	 regions,	 with	 a	
distinctive	homeland	(Padania)	—	linking	these	to	its	claims	for	autonomy.	However,	the	NL	
framed	these	aspects	within	a	narrative	of	‘individualism,	hard	work	and	free	market	values’	
(Ginsborg,	1996,	p.	30)	as	the	distinctive	principles	of	northern	Italians.		
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Overall,	 these	 factors	 point	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 clear	 intersection	 between	 institutional	
asymmetries,	identity	politics	and	its	mobilization	and	socio-economic	dynamics,	which	have	
coalesced	 and	 helped	 shape	 the	 narrative	 of	 ‘distinctiveness’	 underpinning	 autonomy	
referendums	 in	Lombardy	and	Veneto	 (see	 fig.	2).	The	next	section	will	 shed	 light	on	this,	
assessing	the	contextual	 factors	on	which	support	 for	autonomy	referendums	was	built	 in	
the	two	regions.	
[Figure	2	here]	
	
Assessing	distinctiveness:	the	roots	of	autonomy	claims	in	Lombardy	and	Veneto	
The	roots	of	autonomy	claims	in	Lombardy	and	Veneto	are	connected	with	the	long	history	
of	distinctiveness	that	characterizes	them.	The	broad	framework	of	the	North-South	divide	
helps	to	understand	this.	In	short,	the	presence	of	a	longstanding	social	and	economic	gap	
between	a	‘wealthy	North’	and	a	‘sluggish	South’	within	Italy	has	permeated	both	political	
discourses	and	popular	perceptions.	In	this	way,	local	communities	in	Lombardy	and	Veneto	
have	 increasingly	 bought	 into	 the	 argument	 that	 their	 high	 levels	 of	 contributions	 to	 the	
national	 GDP	 is	 unfairly	 redistributed	 across	 the	 whole	 country,	 supporting,	 to	 their	
detriment,	areas	lagging	behind	(especially	in	the	South).	This	narrative	has,	in	turn,	fed	into	
a	widespread	 perception	 that	 regions	 like	 Lombardy	 and	 Veneto	 have	 been	 exploited	 by	
central	government	–	leading	to	a	growing	sense	of	hostility	towards	state	institutions	and	
traditional	 political	 elites	 (Cento	Bull	&	Gilbert,	 2001).	 This	helps	 explain	 the	 salience	and	
persistence	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘northern	 question’	 (Diamanti,	 1996).	 It	 could	 be	 argued,	
therefore,	 that	 the	 autonomy	 referendums	 held	 in	 Lombardy	 and	 Veneto	 graft	 onto	 the	
narrative	of	the	North-South	divide	and	provide	a	further	attempt	at	addressing	the	alleged	
‘fiscal	injustice’	perpetrated	by	the	central	state.	
	
	 11	
Yet,	the	North-South	divide	provides	only	a	partial	interpretive	framework.	Indeed,	it	would	
be	more	accurate	to	differentiate	between	Veneto	and	Lombardy	when	looking	at	the	roots	
of	their	support	for	autonomy	claims.	As	illustrated	in	the	next	section,	whilst	both	regions	
returned	 a	 vote	 in	 favour	 of	 further	 autonomy,	 the	 bulk	 and	 distribution	 of	 support	was	
quite	 diversified	 between	 as	 well	 as	 within	 them.	 As	 noted	 by	 Diamanti	 (2017)	 the	 geo-
political	 category	 ‘Lombardo-Veneto’	 used	 by	 some	 commentators	 does	 not	 hold.	Whilst	
associated	by	a	common	‘malaise’	based	on	economic	motifs	and	dissatisfaction	with	state	
institutions,	Veneto	and	Lombardy	do	not	share	either	a	common	history	or	identity	basis	–	
and	 the	 cultural,	 political	 and	 economic	 traits	 that	 shape	 their	 social	 fabric	 remain	
profoundly	diverse.			
Lombardy	 itself	 is	 far	 from	 homogeneous.	 It	 is	 characterized	 by	 internal	 economic	 and	
political	 differences,	 which	 have	 not	 disappeared	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 when	 regional	
identity	assumed	 increasing	political	 relevance.	At	 the	economic	 level,	a	 clear	 split	 can	be	
observed	 between	 the	 metropolitan	 area	 of	 Milan,	 with	 its	 large	 enterprises	 and	 strong	
finance,	 communication	 and	 service	 sectors,	 and	 a	 set	 of	 ‘hinterlands’	 based	 on	 diverse	
sectors,	from	agriculture	to	mall	and	medium	enterprises	(SMEs).	Perhaps	as	a	consequence	
of	this,	Lombardy	also	lacks	a	unifying	political	sub-culture	(Trigilia,	1986)	and	three	or	four	
distinctive	 political	 areas	 can	 be	 identified,	 with	 the	 NL	 being	 particularly	 strong	 in	 the	
alpine	and	rural	parts	of	the	region.		
Despite	 experiencing	 a	 deep	 leadership	 crisis,	 the	NL	won	 the	 Presidency	 of	 Lombardy	 in	
2013	 with	 Roberto	 Maroni,	 thanks	 to	 the	 support	 of	 a	 broader	 coalition	 of	 parties	 and	
interest	 groups,	 which	 placed	 relatively	 little	 emphasis	 on	 autonomy,	 let	 alone	
independence.	In	previous	years,	during	the	leadership	of	Umberto	Bossi,	the	NL	had	never	
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been	able	to	fully	interpret	the	demands	coming	from	a	very	complex	and	politically	plural	
region	 like	 Lombardy	 and	 had	 represented	 a	 very	 specific,	 and	 far	 from	 majoritarian,	
segment	of	 local	 society.	 The	widespread	awareness	of	 the	economic	exceptionalism	of	a	
region	that	many	Lombards	call	the	‘Italian	Powerhouse’	failed	to	translate	into	a	consistent	
and	politicized	regional	identity.	This	helps	to	explain	why	the	2017	autonomy	referendum	
campaign	 was	 mainly	 based	 on	 ‘technocratic’	 and	 ‘economic’	 issues,	 emphasising	 the	
virtuous	character	of	the	region	and	the	fact	that	its	economic	contribution	to	the	national	
system	should	be	institutionally	recognized	(Regione	Lombardia,	2017).		
Veneto	 is	 characterized	 by	 a	 different	 set	 of	 economic,	 cultural	 and	 political	 traits.	 In	
essence,	 despite	 some	 variations,	 for	 the	most	 part	 the	 economic	 fabric	 of	 the	 region	 is	
embedded	in	a	longstanding	system	of	(successful)	SMEs.	Crucially,	this	model	of	economic	
development	 is	 tightly	 connected	 to	 social,	 cultural	 and	 political	 dimensions.	 Most	 of	
Veneto’s	 SMEs	 are	 family-led.	 They	 are	 also	 part	 of	 established	 networks	 of	 associations,	
structures	 and	 initiatives,	 which	 operate	 across	 the	 main	 sectors	 of	 local	 social	 and	
individual	 life	 	 (Diamanti,	1996;	Diamanti	&	Riccamboni,	1992;	Trigilia,	1991).	This,	 in	turn,	
generates	a	system	of	social	norms	and	values	coherent	with	the	local	model	of	economic	
development,	based	on	the	pillars	of	work,	family	and	community	(Diamanti,	1996).	As	such,	
the	 ‘distinctiveness’	 of	 Veneto	 lies	 in	 a	 strong	 cohesion	 between	 productive	 systems	 and	
local	communities	as	these,	in	practice,	overlap	with	one	another.	Moreover,	the	presence	
of	strong	linguistic	specificity	–	with	a	past	written	and	literary	tradition,	still	reflected	in	the	
wide	use	of	dialect	in	everyday	life	–	adds	a	further	element	of	distinctiveness,	which	cannot	
be	found	in	Lombardy.		
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After	the	collapse	of	the	Christian	Democratic	party	in	the	1990s,	the	Venetian	NL	could	rely	
on	this	pre-existing	political	sub-culture,	dense	social	networks	and	identity	markers	to	give	
voice	 to	and,	 simultaneously,	 shape	a	new	 territorial	 identity.	 In	 recent	years,	particularly	
under	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 current	 regional	 president	 Luca	 Zaia,	 the	 party	 managed	 to	
consolidate	 its	position	as	 the	dominant	political	 force	at	 regional	and	sub-regional	 levels.	
Thus,	 thanks	 to	 a	 mix	 of	 structural	 factors	 and	 political	 entrepreneurship,	 territorial	
mobilization	in	Veneto	has	developed	at	a	deeper	political	and	social	level	than	in	Lombardy	
and	also	adopted	a	more	radical	discourse.		
For	 instance,	 in	 2014	 autonomous	 regional	 groups	 staged	 a	 referendum	 on	 Venetian	
independence.	This	vote	was	unconstitutional,	 it	was	organized	 in	an	 informal	way,	and	 it	
was	not	recognized	by	public	institutions	(Giovannini,	2014).	According	to	Demos&Pi	(2014)	
almost	 half	 of	 the	 Venetian	 population	 participated	 in	 the	 initiative,	 and	 the	majority	 of	
voters	 from	all	political	parties	supported	 independence.	The	centre-left	Democratic	Party	
(PD)	was	 the	only	exception	but,	 remarkably,	more	 than	one	 third	of	 its	voters	expressed	
pro-independence	views	(Demos&Pi,	2014).		
The	organizers	drew	on	historical	 and	 cultural	messages	 in	 their	 campaign	 (e.g.	 flying	 the	
flag	of	the	ancient	Venetian	Republic,	using	dialect	as	a	surrogate	for	a	regional	language).	
However,	research	shows	that	the	bulk	of	support	for	the	pro-independence	cause	was	not	
rooted	in	a	desire	for	self-determination	(Demos&Pi,	2014).	Instead,	the	vote	was	driven	by	
socio-economic	 factors	and	by	a	desire	 to	see	 ‘Venetian	distinctiveness’	being	 recognized.	
This	links	to	the	previously	mentioned	sense	of	resentment	towards	the	central	state	and	its	
institutions,	which	have	long	being	perceived	as	unable	to	represent	and	cater	for	Veneto.	
These	feelings	were	exacerbated	by	the	economic	crisis,	which	widened	the	perceived	sense	
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of	 ‘injustice’	 towards	 the	 system	 of	 fiscal	 redistribution	 across	 Italy	 and,	 crucially,	
undermined	the	‘pillars’	of	Veneto’s	socio-economic	fabric	(work,	community,	family).		
The	autonomy	referendum	promoted	by	the	Venetian	regional	government	 in	2017	grafts	
onto	this	narrative,	and	aimed	to	address	societal	demands	stemming	from	it.	 Indeed,	the	
Venetian	 political	 class	 showed	 awareness	 of	 the	 sense	 of	 frustration	 of	 an	 area	 that	
perceives	 itself	 as	 ‘hard	 done	 by’	 central	 government	 (Diamanti,	 2017)	 –	 and	 used	 the	
referendums	as	a	means	to	reverse	this	process.	
Overall,	 support	 for	autonomy	 in	Lombardy	and	Veneto	 is	 rooted	 in	a	 logic	of	entrenched	
socio-economic	 interests	 and	values,	which	are	 shaped	by	 the	 shared,	overarching	North-
South	divide	narrative,	as	well	as	by	specific	elements	of	regional	distinctiveness.	As	such,	
autonomy	claims	in	the	two	areas	are	tightly	linked	to	their	distinctive	cultural,	political	and	
socio-economic	contexts.	These	differences	manifested	themselves	in	and	impacted	on	the	
referendum	campaigns	and	their	results.	The	next	section	will	analyse	these,	focusing	on	the	
driving	forces	as	well	as	the	cleavages	underpinning	the	vote	in	Lombardy	and	Veneto.		
	
	The	referendums:	campaigns	and	results	
Campaigns	
The	presidents	of	Veneto	(Luca	Zaia)	and	Lombardy	(Roberto	Maroni)	held	the	referendums	
on	 the	 same	 day	 (22	 October	 2017),	 thus	 reinforcing	 the	 idea	 that,	 despite	 the	 existing	
differences	 highlighted	 above,	 a	 political	 axis	 between	 the	 largest	 and	 richest	 regions	 of	
northern	Italy	was	created.	This	was	not	so	difficult	to	achieve:	both	Maroni	and	Zaia	belong	
to	 the	 same	 party	 (NL)	 and	 are	 sensitive	 to	 issues	 of	 regional	 autonomy	 and	 federalism.	
Being	 prominent	 regional	 leaders	 allowed	Maroni	 and	 Zaia	 to	 use	 the	 referendums	 as	 a	
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platform	 to	 showcase	 the	 NL	 as	 the	 main	 political	 actor	 concerned	 with	 the	 needs	 and	
future	of	Lombardy	and	Veneto.		
However,	 the	 vote	 was	 called	 at	 a	 time	 of	 deep	 ideological	 and	 organizational	
transformations	within	the	NL.	Following	the	downfall	of	its	founding	father	Umberto	Bossi	
and	 the	 NL’s	 electoral	 collapse	 of	 2013,	 the	 new	 leader	 Salvini	 radically	 reframed	 the	
territorial	dimension	of	 the	party’s	populist	message	 (Albertazzi,	Giovannini	 and	Seddone,	
2018),	 shifting	 the	 centre-periphery	 cleavage	 that	 defined	 the	 NL	 towards	 the	 European	
level.	 Thus,	 ‘Italy	as	a	whole	 [is	now]	 seen	as	part	of	 a	 “peripheral”	 region	 in	a	European	
“super-state”	dominated	by	the	“core”	countries	of	central-northern	Europe’	(Vampa	2017,	
p.	34).	In	this	way,	Salvini	has	transformed	the	party	into	a	‘national	league’	with	a	nativist-
nationalist,	rather	than	regionalist,	agenda	(Albertazzi,	Giovannini	and	Seddone,	2018)	–	as	
epitomised	by	the	removal	of	the	term	‘North’	from	the	party	symbol.	
The	‘regionalist	struggle’	revived	by	the	two	NL	regional	presidents	through	the	referendum	
is	 clearly	 inconsistent	 with	 Salvini’s	 ‘national	 turn’.	 Although	 formally	 supporting	 the	
referendums,	 the	national	 leader	 conducted	a	 rather	 lukewarm	campaign	and	 jumped	on	
the	 bandwagon	 only	 after	 the	 vote	was	won	 (Albertazzi,	 Giovannini	 and	 Seddone,	 2018).	
These	latent	tensions	between	the	regional	and	national	party	were	put	under	the	spotlight	
by	 the	 autonomy	 referendums.	And	 yet,	Maroni	 and	 Zaia	 ran	well-organized	 and	 focused	
campaigns,	 which	 dominated	 the	 headlines	 of	 local,	 regional	 as	 well	 as	 national	 media,	
gaining	substantial	traction.		
In	 Lombardy,	Maroni	 launched	 a	 campaign	 focused	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘regional	 uniqueness’.	
This	 was	 outlined	 in	 a	 document	 produced	 by	 the	 regional	 government	 emphatically	
entitled	‘Why	Lombardy	is	Special’	(Regione	Lombardia,	2017),	which	was	widely	promoted	
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across	the	region.	The	campaign	concentrated	on	Lombardy’s	areas	of	excellence	at	national	
and	 European	 level,	 highlighting	 regional	 strengths	 in	 terms	 of	 economic	 development,	
healthcare,	welfare,	 culture,	 tourism	and	 territory	 (Regione	 Lombardia,	 2017).	 In	essence,	
this	 developed	 a	 ‘rational	 narrative’	 around	 the	 idea	 that	 Lombardy	 is	 an	 exceptionally	
virtuous	region	that	deserves	more	autonomy,	especially	in	fiscal	terms.	This	‘instrumental’,	
rather	than	emotional	or	‘ideological’,	rhetoric	(Atkins,	2016)	was	also	evident	in	the	leaflets	
distributed	 by	 the	 NL,	 which	 placed	 almost	 exclusive	 emphasis	 on	 ‘territorial	 resources’	
(Lega	Nord	Lombardy,	2017)4.	
Thus,	 economic	 issues	 –	 rather	 than	 those	 of	 culture	 or	 identity	 –	 dominated	 the	 pro-
autonomy	discourse	and	shaped	the	agenda.	This	‘rational’	approach	aimed	at	winning	the	
minds,	rather	than	the	hearts,	of	the	Lombard	electorate	–	and	is	consistent	with	the	idea	of	
economic	distinctiveness	that	characterizes	the	region	discussed	in	the	previous	section.	 It	
was	also	reflected	 in	the	wording	of	the	referendum	question	on	the	ballot,	which	can	be	
described	at	best	as	technocratic:		
“In view of its distinctiveness, and within a context of national unity, should the 
Lombardy Region start the institutional initiatives necessary to request that the 
State attributes to it further forms and special conditions of autonomy as per the 
Article 116, third clause, of the Constitution, and with reference to any legislative 
matter through which such procedure is allowed as per the Article above?” 
Maroni	 was	 the	main	 promoter	 of	 the	 campaigns	 –	 and	 yet,	 he	 portrayed	 the	 vote	 as	 a	
‘common	battle	that	goes	beyond	political	hues’	and	as	a	‘referendum	for	all	Lombards’	and	
not	for	his	own	or	the	NL’s	advantage	(Anastasio,	2017).		
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In	Veneto,	 like	Lombardy,	 the	regional	governor	 led	the	campaign.	The	symbol	of	 the	 ‘Yes	
camp’	 included	a	banner	of	San	Marco	 (the	Saint	Patron	of	Venice	and	 symbol	of	 the	old	
Venetian	 Republic)	 and	 the	 slogan	 ‘Autonomy	 Now’.	 The	 campaign	 narrative	 was	 built	
around	a	mix	of	‘emotive’	themes	(i.e.	making	clear	reference	to	the	‘glorious	autonomous	
past’	 of	 the	 region	 –	 epitomized	 by	 the	 banner	 described	 above)	 and	 economic	 issues	
(emphasising	 that	 sense	 of	 ‘neglected	 distinctiveness’,	 ‘fiscal	 injustice’	 and	 the	 need	 to	
break	 entrenched	 path-dependence	 of	 a	 central	 State	 that	 draws	 too	 heavily	 on	 the	
Venetian	economy	previously	analysed).	The	referendum	vote	was	portrayed	as	a	‘unique,	
historic	 opportunity	 to	 give	 recognition	 to	 Veneto’s	 traditional	 entrepreneurship,	 and	
transform	 it	 into	 concrete	 results	 for	 Venetian	 families	 and	 enterprises’	 (Corriere	 del	
Veneto,	2017).	 In	 this	way,	 the	 campaign	won	both	 the	hearts	 and	 the	minds	of	 voters	–	
gaining	wide	support	among	local	entrepreneurs’	associations,	trade	unions	and	civil	society	
organizations	 (Porcellato,	2017a),	which,	as	previously	outlined,	play	a	key	 role	 in	 shaping	
the	 social	 fabric	 of	 the	 region.	 Significant	 emphasis	 was	 also	 placed	 on	 turnout:	 the	
promoters	 repeatedly	 underlined	 the	 importance	 of	 delivering	 a	 mass	 vote	 in	 favour	 of	
autonomy,	 so	 as	 to	 ‘show	 central	 government	 that	 Veneto	 wants	 and	 deserves	 better’	
(Regione	Veneto,	2017).	This	approach,	 recalling	a	political	 ‘call	 to	arms’,	was	 reflected	 in	
the	 referendum	 question,	 which	 was	 more	 straightforward	 and	 unambiguous	 than	 in	
Lombardy:	
 “Should the Veneto Region be attributed further forms and particular conditions 
of autonomy?” 
Zaia’s	popularity	was	crucial	in	the	campaign.	The	remarkable	level	of	personal	support	that	
he	 enjoys	 across	 Veneto	 (Porcellato,	 2017b)	 means	 that	 he	 could	 affect	 public	 opinion.	
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Importantly,	this	consensus	is	cross	party:	it	comes	from	a	significant	majority	of	NL	voters,	
but	includes	also	supporters	of	all	main	parties	(Diamanti,	2017b).	Zaia	drew	on	traditional	
NL	political	messages	(such	as	‘masters	in	our	own	homes’	and	‘no	more	money	to	Rome’)	
which	 have,	 nonetheless,	 a	 wide-ranging	 appeal	 among	 local	 voters	 of	 all	 hues.	 He	 also	
repeatedly	 claimed	 that	 this	was	 a	 ‘referendum	 for	 all	 Venetians’	 (Diamanti,	 2017b).	 This	
narrative	 gained	 considerable	 traction	 and,	 indeed,	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 vote	 over	 70	
percent	of	the	electors	saw	the	results	of	the	referendum	as	‘a	victory	for	all	Venetians’	as	
opposed	to	a	NL	victory	or	a	personal	one	for	Zaia	(Porcellato,	2017a).	
Thus,	 thanks	 to	 the	 prominence	 of	 its	 regional	 governors	 and	 notwithstanding	 the	 latent	
frictions	with	the	party’s	leadership,	the	NL	played	a	key	part	in	the	referendum	campaigns.	
However,	 no	 significant	 opposition	 emerged	 from	 other	 parties	 and,	 in	 both	 regions,	 the	
referendum	 campaigns	 were	 characterized	 by	 almost	 unanimous	 support	 for	 autonomy	
across	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 political	 actors.	 In	 Lombardy,	 PD’s	 local	 leaders	 organized	 a	 pro-
autonomy	 ‘committee’	of	mayors	and	province	presidents	 (True	Autonomy	 for	 Lombardy,	
TAL),	 led	 by	 Bergamo’s	 mayor	 Giorgio	 Gori.	 Although	 this	 name	 was	 chosen	 to	 mark	 its	
difference	 from	 Maroni’s	 campaign	 and	 to	 distance	 itself	 to	 what	 was	 defined	 as	 ‘NL’s	
propaganda’	(Montanari,	2017),	TAL’s	message	was	of	the	same	nature,	supporting	the	view	
that	Lombardy	deserves	more	powers.	 In	Veneto,	 too,	 local	 representatives	of	all	political	
parties	were	largely	in	favour	of	autonomy	and,	overall,	18	‘Yes	committees’	were	created.		
The	 absence	 of	 any	 real	 campaign	 against	 autonomy	 makes	 the	 Lombard	 and	 Venetian	
referendums	stand	out	in	comparison	with	the	other	European	cases.	Whilst	small	factions	
of	the	main	parties	at	local	level	were	sceptical	about	the	referendum,	these	never	took	an	
organized	 form	 to	 overtly	 oppose	 autonomy.	 Rather	 than	 coalescing	 into	 ‘No	 campaigns’	
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these	actors	simply	opted	for	boycotting	the	consultation	by	not	voting.	The	most	notable	
example	 is	 the	 former	 mayor	 of	 Milan	 Giuliano	 Pisapia	 –	 who	 called	 the	 referendum	 a	
‘political	cheat’	and	declared	that	he	would	not	vote	(Senesi,	2017).		
Thus,	 the	 issue	 of	 autonomy	 gathered	 wide	 consensus,	 and	 the	 campaigns	 were	 not	
polarized.	 Instead,	 their	 leitmotif	 was	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 persisting	 tension	 between	
centralism	 and	 autonomy,	which	went	 beyond	party	 political	 dynamics.	 And	 yet,	 national	
leaders	of	the	same	parties	that	supported	autonomy	at	 local	 level	were,	more	often	than	
not,	against	it.	This,	again,	sheds	light	on	a	tension	between	local	and	national	perception	of	
centralist	vs.	autonomy	discourses	–	which	sees	local	leaders	being	closer	to	the	latter	and	
national	ones	to	the	former.		
Lack	 of	 opposition	made	 the	 results	 of	 both	 referendums	 quite	 predictable.	 However,	 as	
shown	in	the	next	section,	electoral	turnout,	which	can	be	used	as	an	indicator	of	citizens’	
commitment	to	the	autonomy	cause,	varied	substantially	between	and	within	regions.		
	
Results	
The	 results	 of	 the	 two	 referendums	 are	 summarized	 in	 Table	 2.	 It	 can	 be	 immediately	
noticed	 that	whilst	both	 regions	 returned	a	plebiscitary	 support	 for	autonomy,	with	a	Yes	
vote	 above	 95	 percent,	 turnout	 figures	 were	 significantly	 different.	 Turnout	 in	 Veneto	
reached	57.2	percent,	meaning	that	the	absolute	majority	of	eligible	voters	supported	more	
autonomy.	However,	in	Lombardy	turnout	was	below	40	percent,	suggesting	a	much	lower	
mobilization.	 This	 can	 only	 partly	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 50	 percent	 turnout	
threshold	was	 set	 for	 the	 Venetian	 referendum	 in	 order	 for	 the	 results	 to	 be	 considered	
valid,	whereas	no	such	requirement	was	established	in	Lombardy.	Indeed,	the	political	and	
socio-economic	differences	identified	earlier	in	the	article	may	also	account	for	the	marked	
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discrepancy	between	the	two	regions.	As	noted	by	Diamanti	(2017),	the	referendum	results	
became	 an	 opportunity	 for	 Veneto	 to	 reassert	 its	 difference	 and	 distance	 itself	 not	 only	
from	Rome	but	also	from	Milan.	From	a	political	perspective,	in	fact,	Lombardy	is	in	a	much	
less	 ‘peripheral’	 position	 than	 Veneto	 and	 is	 less	 affected	 by	 the	 competition	 from	 the	
special	statute	regions	of	the	North-East.				
[Table	2	here]	
Figure	3	provides	a	comparative	overview	by	considering	autonomy	referendums	 in	other	
European	 countries,	 concentrating	 on	 levels	 of	 participation	 (horizontal	 axis)	 and	 the	
percentage	of	voters	choosing	the	pro-autonomy	option	(vertical	axis).	Clearly,	the	Venetian	
referendum	 is	 among	 those	 in	 which	 strong	 support	 for	 autonomy	 is	 combined	 with	
widespread	 mobilization.	 In	 this	 category	 we	 can	 include	 the	 Basque	 and	 Catalan	
referendums	in	1979	and	the	1997	Scottish	referendum,	which	marked	crucial	moments	in	
the	process	of	regionalization	and	devolution	in	Spain	and	the	UK.	Lombardy,	in	contrast,	is	
a	 case	 of	 a	 strong	 pro-autonomy	 vote	 but	 in	 a	 context	 of	 weak	 political	 mobilization.	
Turnout	in	its	referendum	is	among	the	lowest	across	Europe.	It	is	similar	to	the	Andalusian	
and	Welsh	 referendums,	which	 took	 place	 in	 2007	 and	 2011	 respectively	 and	 resulted	 in	
rather	modest	 changes	 in	 centre-periphery	 relations	 (Wyn	 Jones	&	 Scully,	 2012,	 pp.	 110-
111).	Interestingly	the	previous	Welsh	referendum	(1997),	which	led	to	the	establishment	of	
devolved	institutions,	is	situated	in	the	middle	of	the	four	sectors	(turnout	was	significantly	
lower	than	in	Scotland	and	the	electorate	was	split	in	half),	whilst	the	1979	one	is	the	only	
clear	 case	 of	 referendum	 in	 which	 relatively	 high	 levels	 of	 participation	 led	 to	 a	 clear	
rejection	of	the	autonomy	option.	Lastly,	the	2004	referendum	in	the	North-East	of	England	
did	not	encourage	high	levels	of	mobilization	and,	since	it	was	seen	as	part	of	a	‘top-down’,	
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‘elite-driven’	process	(Willett	&	Giovannini,	2014;	see	also	Figure	1),	it	was	rejected	by	a	vast	
majority	of	the	few	who	voted.		
[Figure	3	here]	
An	 analysis	 based	 on	 153	 municipalities5	 in	 Veneto	 and	 Lombardy	 provides	 also	 some	
insights	 into	 the	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 dynamics	 that	 were	 in	 place	 during	 the	
referendums.	We	are	aware	of	 the	 limits	of	 this	analysis	but,	 to	our	knowledge,	no	other	
attempt	 has	 so	 far	 been	 made	 to	 map	 support	 for	 autonomy	 at	 sub-regional	 level	 in	
Lombardy	 and	 Veneto.	 Table	 3	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 a	 linear	 regression	 model.	 Cross-
municipal	variation	in	turnout6	 is	our	dependent	variable	(measured	in	percentage	points).	
The	 model	 includes	 various	 geographical,	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 independent	
variables,	which	may	help	us	explain	this	variation.	The	first	is	a	dummy	variable	comparing	
municipalities	in	Veneto	and	Lombardy.	This	is	followed	by	the	percentages	obtained	by	the	
four	 main	 parties	 in	 the	 previous	 national	 election	 (2014	 European	 election)	 across	 the	
municipalities.	 Variables	 measuring	 population	 size	 and	 per	 capita	 income	 are	 also	
included7.	Both	standardized	and	unstandardized	coefficients	are	shown.	
Even	 controlling	 for	 political,	 demographic	 and	 socio-economic	 factors,	 the	 difference	
between	municipalities	in	Veneto	and	Lombardy	remains	substantial.	On	average,	turnout	in	
the	 municipalities	 of	 Veneto	 is	 20	 percentage	 points	 higher	 than	 in	 Lombardy.	 The	
standardized	coefficient	of	this	variable	is	the	strongest	one,	suggesting	that	cross-regional	
differences	play	an	important	role	in	explaining	cross-municipal	variation.	The	second	most	
important	variable,	as	expected,	is	the	electoral	strength	of	the	NL,	which	has	a	positive	and	
statistically	significant	coefficient.	Also	the	coefficient	of	the	other	main	centre-right	party,	
Berlusconi’s	Forza	Italia	(FI),	which	governs	both	regions	with	the	NL,	despite	being	smaller,	
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is	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 (although	 at	 the	 0.05	 level).	 The	 coefficients	 of	 the	
other	 two	parties,	 the	centre-left	PD	and	 the	populist	Five	Star	Movement	 (M5S)	are	also	
positive,	but	not	statistically	significant.	These	results	confirm	that	there	was	no	significant	
political	 opposition	 to	 the	 referendum.	Wealthier	municipalities	 seem	 to	have	been	more	
active	 in	 the	 referendum	 and	 this	 may	 be	 due	 to	 the	 importance	 that	 fiscal	 autonomy	
played	 in	 the	 campaign,	 as	 these	 are	 the	 areas	 that	 make	 a	 greater	 contribution	 to	 the	
territorial	 redistribution	 of	 resources.	 Consequently,	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 support	
processes	of	fiscal	federalization	that	weaken	equalization	mechanisms.	Lastly,	participation	
was	 significantly	 stronger	 in	 smaller	 municipalities.	 The	 population	 size	 coefficient	 is	
negative,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 larger	 the	 municipality,	 the	 lower	 the	 turnout	 in	 the	
referendum.	
[Table	3	here]	
The	latter	result	seems	to	point	to	a	general	divide	between	large	urban	centres	and	smaller	
provincial	towns,	which	could	be	read	as	a	urban-rural	or	centre-periphery	cleavage	at	the	
sub-regional	level.	Whilst	the	main	cities	(capoluoghi)	reacted	mildly	to	the	call	for	territorial	
mobilization,	provincial	communities	were	much	keener.	As	shown	in	Figure	4,	there	was	a	
considerable	 difference	 in	 levels	 of	 turnout	 between	main	 cities	 and	 provincial	 towns.	 In	
Lombardy	turnout	in	the	capoluoghi	was	10	percentage	points	lower	than	in	the	provincial	
areas.	 In	Veneto	the	gap	was	even	greater,	13	percent.	 If	only	the	inhabitants	of	the	main	
Venetian	cities	had	voted,	the	referendum	would	have	not	passed	the	50	percent	threshold	
and,	consequently,	would	have	not	been	valid.	This	suggests	that	territorial	mobilization	in	
both	contexts	was	 far	 from	being	geographically	homogeneous	and	aggregate	results	may	
hide	important	differences	and	tensions	existing	at	the	sub-regional	level.	This	is	true	even	
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in	a	region	like	Veneto,	where,	due	to	its	socio-economic	conditions,	support	for	autonomy	
was	 expected	 to	 be	 more	 evenly	 spread.	 Yet,	 Tentoni	 (2018)	 shows	 that	 electoral	
differences	 between	 cities	 and	 peripheries	 have	 been	 historically	 important	 in	 the	 Italian	
context	and	do	not	only	derive	from	socio-economic	factors	but	also	from	long-term	cultural	
and	political	dynamics.		
In	 comparison	 with	 the	 Catalan	 case,	 where	 Barcelona	 has	 traditionally	 been	 less	 pro-
autonomy	 or	 pro-independence	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 region8,	 it	 seems	 that	 regional	
territorial	mobilization	 is	 usually	more	 appealing	 to	 peripheral	 communities.	 Indeed	 they	
may	 consider	 central	 institutions	 as	 too	 remote	 and	 unaccountable,	 uninterested	 in	 the	
details	of	local	governance	and	more	sensitive	to	the	needs	of	larger	urban	conglomerates.	
Strengthening	meso-level	institutions	could	therefore	be	seen	by	smaller	communities	as	a	
solution	to	facilitate	their	access	to	decision-making	processes.				
[Figure	4	here]	
In	 short,	 the	 evidence	 presented	 here	 suggests	 that	 an	 analysis	 based	 on	 the	 aggregate	
share	of	votes	cast	in	favour	of	autonomy	does	not	account	for	considerable	differences	in	
the	 levels	 of	 participation	 between	 and	within	 regions.	 Firstly,	 even	 though	 the	 Yes	 vote	
won	 more	 than	 90	 percent	 of	 the	 vote	 in	 both	 regions,	 turnout	 figures	 indicate	 that	
autonomy	 is	 a	 much	 more	 salient	 issue	 in	 Veneto	 than	 in	 Lombardy	 and	 this	 may	 be	
explained	 not	 only	 by	 cultural	 and	 political	 legacies	 but	 also	 by	 socio-economic	 and	
geographical	 factors	 (for	 instance,	 proximity	 to	 and	 competition	 from	 special	 statute	
regions).	Secondly,	far	from	being	political	monoliths,	regions	may	also	be	characterized	by	
significant	 internal	 variation.	 Even	 a	 region	 like	 Veneto,	which	 overall	 expressed	 a	 strong	
support	for	autonomy,	appears	to	be	internally	divided	as	the	strong	differences	in	turnout	
	
	 24	
between	cities	and	provinces	indicate.	A	more	nuanced	interpretation	of	the	results	allows	
also	a	better	understanding	of	the	political	and	 institutional	effects	of	 the	vote,	which	are	
assessed	in	the	next	section.	
After	the	Referendums:	Political	and	Institutional	Consequences	
The	 Lombardy	 and	 Veneto	 autonomy	 referendums	 have	 had	 important	 political	 and	
institutional	 consequences,	 shedding	 light	 on	 both	 latent	 and	 new	 ‘fractures’.	 From	 a	
political	 perspective,	 they	 have	 revealed	 a	 growing	 gap	 between	 parties	 at	 regional	 and	
national	 level.	 As	 emphasized	 in	 our	 analysis,	 the	NL	was	 one	 of	 the	 political	 actors	 that	
dominated	 the	 debate	 on	 autonomy	 in	 Lombardy	 and	 Veneto.	 Whilst	 some	 political	
commentators	 warned	 that	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Yes	 camp	 could	 have	 been	 read	 as	 a	 ‘NL	
victory’	 and	 exploited	 by	 the	 party	 to	 widen	 its	 appeal,	 the	 results	 had	 a	 more	 divisive	
impact	 in	 practice.	 The	 turn	 towards	 a	 nativist-nationalist	 approach	 by	 the	 party	 on	 the	
national	 stage	 and	 the	 de	 facto	 abandonment	 of	 the	 ‘regionalist	 cause	 of	 the	 North’	
(Albertazzi,	Giovannini	and	Seddone,	2018)	certainly	played	a	key	role.	This	emphasizes	the	
presence	of	latent	tensions	within	the	NL,	especially	between	the	factions	of	the	party	more	
aligned	to	its	new	ideological	turn,	and	those	closer	to	its	original	regionalist	stance.		
Another	key	political	consequence	of	the	referendum	concerns	its	impact	on	the	Democratic	
Party.	The	party,	which,	at	the	time	of	the	referendums,	controlled	central	government,	was	
internally	 divided.	 In	 particular,	 a	 vertical	 split	 between	national	 leadership	 and	 local	 and	
regional	 representatives	of	 the	party	emerged.	Whereas	 the	 then	national	 leader,	Matteo	
Renzi,	 labelled	 the	 autonomy	 referendum	 as	 useless	 (D’Attino,	 2017),	 as	 previously	
mentioned,	PD	mayors	in	Lombardy	joined	forces	in	the	TAL	network,	actively	campaigning	
for	 autonomy.	 This	 suggests	 that	 territorial	mobilization	 and	 the	 launch	 of	 pro-autonomy	
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campaigns	 may	 produce	 (or	 accelerate)	 a	 process	 of	 ‘stratarchization’	 and	 territorial	
differentiation	within	 state-wide	parties	 (Carty,	2004).	Calls	 for	 greater	organizational	 and	
programmatic	 differentiation	 from	 the	 centre	 and	 the	 development	 of	 alternative	
constitutional	goals	may	therefore	affect	 the	 internal	cohesion	of	political	parties	 that	are	
formally	cross-territorial	(Hepburn,	2010).	
From	an	institutional	perspective,	the	Lombardy	and	Veneto	referendums	could	impact	in	a	
substantial	way	on	 the	 Italian	decentralized	 system,	 leading	 to	 further	 fragmentation	 and	
asymmetries.	In	many	respects,	the	referendums	have	put	under	the	spotlight	the	question	
of	regional	autonomy,	with	the	potential	to	widen	this	across	all	Italian	regions	–	thus	giving	
new	impetus	to	the	implementation	of	Article	116	Clause	3	of	the	Italian	constitution,	which	
had	remained	dormant	for	several	years.		
Indeed,	 in	the	wake	of	the	referendums,	Lombardy	and	Veneto	as	well	as	Emilia-Romagna	
entered	 a	 process	 of	 negotiations	 with	 central	 government	 between	 November	 and	
December	 2017.	 But	 these	 regions	 used	 different	 approaches.	 Whilst	 the	 results	 of	
consultative	 referendums	could	be	seen	as	giving	Lombardy	and	Veneto	more	contractual	
leverage	at	the	negotiation	table,	in	line	with	the	differences	highlighted	in	our	analysis,	the	
two	regions	did	not	‘join	forces’.	Shortly	after	the	vote,	Veneto	regional	government	took	a	
bottom-up	approach,	and	passed	the	proposal	for	a	‘national	law	of	regional	initiative’	to	be	
presented	to	Parliament,	including	‘details	for	the	recognition	of	further	regional	autonomy	
for	Veneto,	putting	into	effect	Art.116’,	with	a	view	to	keep	most	of	the	regional	income	in-
house	(Giunta	Regionale	Veneto,	2017	–	subsequently	approved	by	the	regional	assembly).	
This	was	passed	onto	the	Italian	Prime	Minister	and	the	Minister	for	Regional	Affairs	who,	
acknowledging	 the	 compatibility	 of	 such	 request	 with	 the	 Constitution,	 opened	 officially	
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unilateral	negotiations.	Meanwhile,	Lombardy	and	Emilia-Romagna	entered	jointly	the	first	
phase	of	 the	negotiations	 for	more	autonomy,	 adopting	a	more	 ‘institutional’	 approach	–	
giving	 a	 mandate,	 through	 deliberations	 of	 their	 respective	 Assemblies,	 to	 their	 regional	
governors	to	enter	negotiations	with	central	government.	Eventually,	in	February	2018	the	
Minister	 for	 Regional	 Affairs	 and	 Autonomies	 and	 the	 regional	 governors	 signed	 three	
distinct	preliminary	agreements.	Although	including	some	elements	of	differentiation,	these	
identified	 a	 number	 of	 shared	 ‘priority	 areas’	 (Labour	 Policy,	 Education,	 Health,	
Environment,	international	and	EU	relations).		
The	next	 step	 (i.e.	 the	preparation	of	a	Bill	 to	put	before	Parliament)	was	delayed	by	 the	
general	election	of	March	2018.	The	‘contract’	signed	by	the	new	Five	Star	Movement/Lega	
coalition	 government	 did	 include	 the	 objective	 of	 quickly	 concluding	 the	 on-going	
negotiations	 with	 regions.	 Accordingly,	 the	 new	 Regional	 Affairs	 Minister,	 Erika	 Stefani,	
reiterated	that	settling	the	issue	of	increased	regional	autonomy	is	one	of	her	priorities.	She	
also	 stated	 that	 ‘the	 objective	 of	 the	 government	 is	 to	 prepare	 individual	 Bills	 for	 the	
concession	of	further	autonomy,	based	on	regional	specificities’	adding	that	‘this	is	a	system	
of	“differentiated	autonomy”,	and	so	too	the	legislative	answer	given	to	each	region	has	to	
be	differentiated	–	but	the	technical	frame	and	legislative	form	will	be	the	same	for	all	the	
regions’	 (Chamber	 of	 Deputies,	 2018).	 Interestingly,	 this	 claim	 seems	 to	 emphasise	 the	
possibility	to	prompt	‘virtuous	competition’	between	territories.		
However,	as	of	December	2018,	the	government	has	taken	no	further	step	and,	as	a	result,	
Lombardy,	Veneto	and	Emilia-Romagna	governors	sent	a	 joint	 letter	to	the	Prime	Minister	
to	 prompt	 a	 swift	 conclusion	 to	 the	 process	 (Regione	 Emilia-Romagna,	 2018).	 Finally,	 the	
path	opened	by	 Lombardy,	Veneto	and	Emilia-Romagna	has	had	a	 spillover	effect.	Out	of	
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the	other	12	ordinary	statute	regions,	seven	have	given	a	mandate	to	their	governor	to	ask	
central	 government	 to	 enter	 negotiations	 for	 further	 autonomy	 (Campania,	 Liguria,	 Lazio,	
Marche,	 Piedmont,	 Tuscany	 and	 Umbria);	 three	 have	 started	 preliminary	 initiatives	 in	 a	
similar	direction	(Basilicata,	Calabria	and	Apulia);	whilst	two	(Abruzzi	and	Molise)	have	not	
taken	any	action	(Senate	Research	Centre,	2018).		
Firstly,	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	 autonomy	 referendums	 seem	 to	 be	 having	 the	 effect	 of	
strengthening	 the	 competitive	 character	 of	 Italian	 regionalism	 (Keating,	 2017;	 Keating,	
1997)	–	whereby	individual,	or	small	groups	of	regions,	seek	to	gain	the	best	possible	deal	
with	 the	 government	 for	 themselves.	 Crucially,	 despite	 the	 predicaments	 of	 central	
government,	 this	process	could	 foster	a	market-type	 form	of	 competitions	among	 regions	
for	 further	 autonomy	 that	 could	 lead	 to:	 i)	 convergence	 between	 stronger/better	
performing	 regions	 that	 currently	 have	 ordinary	 statute	 and	 special	 statute	 regions;	 ii)	 a	
vicious	process	of	divergence	between	‘winners’	and	‘laggards’	within	the	ordinary	statute	
regions	–	which	could	set	new	divides	as	well	as	widen	existing	cleavages.		
Secondly,	 and	 related	 to	 this,	 the	 referendums	 have	 set	 a	 precedent	 in	 what	 could	 be	
characterised	 as	 an	 uneven	 ‘race	 towards	 autonomy’,	 reducing	 the	 likelihood	 of		
‘convergence’	within	 the	 already	 highly	 diversified	 regional	 autonomy	 framework	 in	 Italy.	
Some	commentators	argue	that	the	path	entered	by	Lombardy,	Veneto	and	Emilia-Romagna	
with	their	agreement	on	shared	priority	areas	could	lead	to	a	degree	of	‘linear	asymmetry’	–	
prompting	 other	 regions	 to	 follow	 suit	 by	 proposing	 similar	 initiatives	 of	 ‘parallel	
differentiation’.	This	would	thus	encourage	an	evolution	of	the	Italian	system	of	regionalism	
towards	a	new,	but	more	advanced,	 symmetry	 (Ferrara,	2018).	However,	 it	 remains	 to	be	
seen	whether	 this	will	 be	 the	 case.	 The	 prospect	 of	 having	 individual	 legislation	 for	 each	
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region	suggests	that	there	is	the	possibility	to	inscribe,	and	therefore	legitimise,	some	forms	
of	 regional	 differentiation.	 A	 key	 point,	 which	 will	 have	 to	 be	 addressed	 once/if	 the	
government	 implements	 the	 individual	 agreements,	 concerns	 their	 funding.	 If	 diversified	
fiscal	powers	were	to	be	granted	to	individual	or	small	groups	of	regions,	this	would	see	a	
reduction	 in	 the	 national	 redistribution	 of	 resources,	 thus	 detracting	 from	 territorial	
solidarity	and	putting	under	threat	the	overall	stability	of	the	system	(as	it	happened	Spain,	
for	 instance).	 Remarkably,	 so	 far	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 asymmetric	
regionalism	has	not	been	matched	by	an	adequate	rethinking/reform	of	the	central	state	–	
and	 this	 could	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 ‘unifying	 nodes’	 that	 hold	 the	 country	
together.	 Finally,	 differentiated	 regionalism	 could	 also	 foster	 either	 forms	 of	 ‘emotive	
secession’	 or	 even	 centrifugal	 dynamics	 in	 regions	 with	 a	 strong	 cultural	 capital	 that	
perceive	 themselves	 simultaneously	 as	 ‘economic	 centres’	 and	 ‘political	 peripheries’	
(Diamanti,	 2017)	 on	 the	 national	 stage	 (e.g.	 Veneto)	 –	 especially	 if	 central	 government	
proves	unable/unwilling	to	respond	adequately	to	their	(fiscal)	autonomy	requests.	
	
Conclusion	
This	article	has	sought	to	assess	recent	developments	 in	 Italian	regionalism	by	considering	
the	two	autonomy	referendums	in	Veneto	and	Lombardy	held	 in	October	2017.	Our	study	
was	 based	 on	 three	 levels	 of	 comparison:	 across	 countries,	 across	 regions	 and	 within	
regions.	A	comparative	analysis	including	all	regional	referendums	held	in	Europe	since	1970	
has	allowed	us	to	contextualize	the	two	cases.	We	have	highlighted	that	both	Venetian	and	
Lombard	 referendums	 are	 quite	 peculiar	 in	 the	 European	 context	 since	 they	 were	
unilaterally	 promoted	 by	 regional	 governments	 (within	 a	 constitutionally	 legitimate	
framework)	and	aimed	at	starting	a	process	rather	than	ratifying	new	legislation	previously	
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agreed	 by	 different	 institutional	 levels.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 we	 have	 noticed	 substantial	
differences	between	the	two	regions	not	only	in	the	process	that	led	to	the	referendums	but	
also	in	their	results.	Between	the	two,	only	Veneto	comes	closer	to	other	cases	of	‘strong’	
regionalism	(or	‘sub-state	nationalism’)	such	as	Scotland,	Catalonia	and	the	Basque	Country,	
characterized	 by	 diffuse	 support	 for	 autonomy	 (and,	 in	 some	 cases,	 even	 independence).	
Socio-economic	 factors,	 political	 competition,	 the	 politicization	 of	 regional	 identity	 and	
institutional	legacies	all	seem	to	contribute	to	an	explanation	of	cross-regional	differences.		
We	have	also	 shown	 that	 regions	may	be	characterized	by	 significant	 internal	 variation	 in	
their	territorial	mobilization.	In	particular,	we	can	observe	a	significant	gap	between	urban	
areas	and	peripheries,	which	seems	to	replicate	a	‘centre-periphery’	cleavage	at	the	regional	
level.	This	latter	point	is	often	neglected	by	the	literature,	which	tends	to	consider	regions	
as	political	 ‘monoliths’.	A	more	nuanced	approach	 to	 the	 study	of	 regionalism	 should	not	
only	focus	on	regional-central	relations	but	should	also	account	for	tensions	within	regions	
(e.g.	regional	vs.	local	levels	and	cities	vs.	provinces).	Lastly,	our	analysis	has	indicated	that,	
when	successful,	 regional	 referendums	might	 legitimize	demands	 for	more	autonomy	and	
trigger	a	competitive	process,	which	could	 lead	 to	more	cross-regional	differentiation	and	
territorial	fragmentation.	Italy	does	not	stand	alone	in	this	respect,	as	the	cases	of	Spain	and	
the	UK	clearly	demonstrate.		
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Notes	
																																								 																				
1	This	category	also	includes	provinces,	districts	and	sub-state	nations.		
2	We	exclude	the	2014	Scottish	independence	referendum,	as	this	does	not	fit	within	our	definition.	
Scotland	did	get	further	autonomy,	or	‘devo	max’.	However,	strictly	speaking,	this	was	not	the	result	
2	We	exclude	the	2014	Scottish	independence	referendum,	as	this	does	not	fit	within	our	definition.	
Scotland	did	get	further	autonomy,	or	‘devo	max’.	However,	strictly	speaking,	this	was	not	the	result	
of	the	vote	itself,	as	the	ballot	simply	asked	whether	Scotland	should	become	an	independent	
nation,	and	no	question	was	posed	as	to	whether	it	should	get	further	devolution	(indeed,	central	
government	refused	for	this	latter	option	to	be	included).	Thus,	‘devo	max’	was	offered	by	
Westminster	only	after	the	vote	had	taken	place,	as	a	way	to	respond	to	the	momentum	generated	
by	the	referendum.	As	such,	increased	autonomy	did	not	result	from	a	referendum	victory,	as	per	
our	definition.	
3	An	attempt	was	made	by	Lombardy	between	2006	and	2007	but	it	did	not	lead	to	a	referendum	
because	the	centre-left	national	government	collapsed	and	the	centre-right,	including	the	NL,	was	
back	in	power	and	could	then	promote	pro-federalist	reforms	(including	law	42/2009	on	fiscal	
federalism)	from	central	government.	
4	Examples	of	Lombard	NL	leaflets	can	be	found	here	https://bit.ly/2G6MAR6.	
5	Municipalities	with	more	than	15,000	inhabitants	(no	complete	data	are	available	for	smaller	
municipalities).	
6	We	focus	on	turnout	because	we	observe	significant	differences	in	levels	of	participation	not	only	
between	the	two	regions,	as	shown	above,	but	also	within	the	two	regions	–	whilst	the	percentage	
of	Yes	vote	is	much	more	territorially	homogeneous.	
7	A	logged	transformation	of	these	variables	is	used,	since	their	distribution	is	highly	skewed	and	
wide.	
8	Barcelona	is	the	stronghold	of	Ciudadanos,	a	party	that	became	politically	active	in	2006,	
canvassing	for	a	‘No’	vote	in	the	Catalan	referendum	on	the	new	autonomy	statute	(Rodríguez	
Teruel	&	Barrio,	2016).	Today	it	is	the	leading	party	of	the	anti-independence	front.	
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TABLES	
	
Table	1.	Reasons	for	holding	autonomy	referendums	
	 Ratifying	reform?	 Introducing	new	
political	
institutions	
Transferring	
policy	making	
powers	
Transferring	fiscal	
powers	
Wales	1979	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Scotland	1979	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Catalonia	1979	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Basque	Country	
1979	
Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Galicia	1980	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Andalusia	1980-
1981	
Yes	(1981)	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Wales	1997	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Scotland	1997	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Corse	2003	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
North-East	
England	2004	
No	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Catalonia	2006	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
Andalusia	2007	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
Wales	2011	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	
Alsace	2013	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 No	
Lombardy	2017	 No		 No	 Yes	 Yes	
Veneto	2017	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
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Table	2.	The	results	of	the	autonomy	referendums	in	Lombardy	and	Veneto	(absolute	
number	of	voters	in	brackets)	
	 Yes	 No	 Turnout	
Lombardy	 96.02%	
(2,875,438)	
3.98%	
(119,051)	
38.11%	
(3,017,707)	
Veneto	 98.1%	
(2,273,985)	
1.9%	
(43,938)	
57.2%	
(2,328,949)	
Sources:		Lombardy	Region	(goo.gl/abuF3D),	Veneto	Region	(goo.gl/RtY4xZ)		
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Table	3.	Determinants	of	referendum	turnout	in	Venetian	and	Lombard	municipalities		
	 Coefficient	 Standardized	
Veneto	 20.265	(0.812)***	 0.883	
NL	(2014)	 0.968	(0.167)***	 0.373	
PD	(2014)		 0.226	(0.183)	 0.095	
FI	(2014)	 0.544	(0.216)**	 0.13	
M5S	(2014)	 0.161	(0.172)	 0.047	
Per	capita	income	(log)		 7.668	(3.151)**	 0.087	
Population	Size	(log)	 -2.751	(0.486)***	 -0.161	
Constant	 -42.479	(37.601)	 	
Adj	R-Squared	 0.902	
N	 153	
*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;***p<0.01	
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FIGURES	
	
Figure	1.	Autonomy	referendums,	at	what	level	are	they	promoted?	
	
	
Figure	2.	Linking	institutional,	socio-economic	and	political	factors	to	autonomy	
referendum
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Figure	3.	The	Lombard	and	Venetian	referendums	in	comparative	perspective	
	
Figure	4.	Turnout:	comparing	main	cities	(capoluoghi)	to	the	rest	of	the	region	
	
